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A model widely used for decisions which have a public interest element is delegation of 
parliamentary authority to a bureaucratic agency, within the confines of a legislative 
framework which directs the relevant agents how social welfare should be maximised 
within the context of the issue at hand.  This is intended to remove the politicisation of 
decision-making, and allow for an objective approach.  However, except in very limited 
circumstances, it is unlikely that bureaucratic agents will be able to act in this fashion.  
Using Arrow’s (1950) Impossibility Theorem, this paper outlines why this is the case, and 
the consequences of delegation. 
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Introduction 
An important role of government in modern society is to maximise aspects of social 
welfare that are subject to some form of market failure, according to the directions of a 
parliament within the purview of the government agency concerned.  For example, a 
department for social services might seek to improve the welfare of the poorest in society, 
whilst an economic regulator might seek to improve economically-efficient allocation of 
resources by restricting the ability of a monopoly to extract rents from its customers.  The 
approach, in general, is for a parliament to establish the way in which welfare is to be 
maximised in legislation, which then serves to instruct bureaucratic agents in their task of 
giving effect to this legislation through their operations.  This is intended to remove the 
politicisation of decision-making, and allow for an objective approach.  However, except 
in very limited circumstances, it is unlikely that bureaucratic agents will be able to act in 
this fashion.  Using Arrow’s (1950) Impossibility Theorem, this paper outlines why this 
will be the case, and the consequences of using the approach. 
 
Section Two of this paper examines some different decision-making frameworks and 
explores the nature of objectivity in economic regulation.  Section Three describes some 
of the literature surrounding Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, and develops an application 
of the theorem to delegation of authority by a parliament to bureaucratic agents acting on 
its behalf.  Section Four explores the consequences of this application of Arrow’s 
theorem, and Section Five explores alternate means of allocating resources which do not 
require such delegation.  Section Six concludes. 
Delegation of Authority 
In the economic paradigm of perfect competition, resource allocation decisions are made 
in the market, through the private interactions of market participants.  In many real-world 
cases, however, markets are imperfect; property rights are poorly defined, information is 
neither perfect nor symmetric and market participants do not have equal power.  Thus, 
many resource allocation decisions require some form of communal, or public-choice 
element.  A very simple society, with few non-market choices, might be able to make 
democratic choices over resource allocation with relative ease.  As a society becomes 
more complex, however, this process of plebiscites becomes far more time-consuming.   
 
One response is for the community to choose a certain subset of its members who will 
make such decisions as their full-time occupation, with the remaining people periodically 
choosing the decision-makers.  This is representative democracy.  However, many 
societies become sufficiently complex that the number of public-interest resource 
allocation decisions is too great, even for a full-time parliament.  Thus, decision-making 
is delegated to bureaucratic agents within government.  Since there is no electoral check 
on their behaviour, these agents are restricted by laws passed by parliament which 
instructs them how to make the relevant decisions, and what aspects of social welfare 
they should be maximising.  One way of viewing this legislation is as a ‘resource 
allocation mechanism’, which parliament designs, employing bureaucratic agents to 
undertake the actual operation of the mechanism in an objective fashion.  In many cases, 
these bureaucratic agents are given wide autonomy in undertaking their task, in order that 
they might do so without political interference. 
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The intent of this paper is to show that the assumption that a bureaucratic agent, given a 
well-designed resource allocation function to optimise, can optimise the function in an 
objective fashion is simply incorrect.  Instead, almost every social welfare maximisation 
problem addressed by bureaucratic agents requires the use of subjective information, or 
assumptions, in order to obtain an unequivocal answer to the particular question being 
addressed.   Subjective information means that the decisions made by the bureaucratic 
agents are a form of social choice, and are thus subject to the restrictions of social choice 
theory, chiefly Arrow’s (1950) Impossibility Theorem.  As this paper shows, this has 
some quite profound consequences for the way in which resource allocation is governed.  
First, however, it is important to explore in more detail the bureaucratic decision-making 
process. 
The Process of Making a Decision in a Bureaucracy 
Often, the delegation of decision-making from a parliament to a bureaucratic agency 
takes one of two forms.  Firstly, the bureaucratic agency may act as the operator and 
manager of the service being provided.  Alternatively, the bureaucratic agency might act 
as a regulator, and allow the private sector to undertake the actual task of service delivery.  
In fact, both of these forms of governance are part of the same continuum.  The resource 
allocation function which parliament encapsulates in legislation to govern the activities of 
the bureaucratic agency is, in mathematical terms, a mapping.  In some cases, the range of 
the mapping is wide; parliament is satisfied with a great many possible outcomes and 
merely wishes to prevent some undesirable outcomes from occurring.  In these cases, a 
regulatory approach is more appropriate.  In other cases, the mapping is very tight; there 
are only a few possible outcomes which a parliament is willing to allow, and thus it 
requires greater involvement in the process by its bureaucratic agents. 
 
Regardless of where on the continuum a given mapping sits, all share one important 
characteristic; the bureaucratic agents governed by the resource allocation function are 
expected to take information, process it objectively and then deliver outcomes which 
optimise some form of social welfare.  In effect, they are expected to act in a similar 
fashion to the ‘Walrasian Auctioneer’ whom economic theory assumes hypothetically 
ensures that resource allocation in a perfectly competitive market leads to a maximisation 
of social welfare.  It is this visible hand which this paper contends does not work. 
 
To provide a flavour of how a resource allocation function operates, consider the process 
of economic regulation, as undertaken by Australia’s main economic regulator, the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC).  Other economic regulators 
operate in a very similar fashion, and have done for 100 years (see Virtue, 1909).  
Economic regulation is a useful case-study to examine because of its very formal process.  
The results of this paper, however, extend to all points on the continuum outlined above. 
 
The resource allocation function that the ACCC has been charged to implement in respect 
to monopoly infrastructure is set out in Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act 1974.  The 
Act requires the ACCC to endeavour to minimise the extent to which an infrastructure 
owner can abuse its natural monopoly position through the extraction of monopoly rents 
from its customers, and hence minimise the negative resource allocation consequences 
associated with monopoly.  Figure One encapsulates the task of an economic regulator 






























Regulators of monopoly infrastructure endeavour to minimise the size of the Harberger 
Triangle by bringing the price of the service of the monopolist track infrastructure owner 
(Pm) closer to the competitive level (Ppc) in order that this might induce supply (Qm) to 
move out to the competitive level (Qpc).  The regulator does this by setting a price cap.     
 
In doing this, regulators face two immediate problems.  Firstly, inefficiencies associated 
with monopoly production may manifest themselves through over-capitalisation or 
bloated costs, rather than through excess profits.  Thus, rather than using the actual cost 
function of the firm being regulated, regulators use a model of a ‘best practice’ 
infrastructure.  Secondly, infrastructure commonly has high fixed and sunk costs.  Prices 
based upon short-run marginal costs will be insufficient to cover sunk and fixed costs and 
hence future investment or maintenance of existing capital assets would become 
impossible.  Thus, regulators endeavour to set prices at a level equal to the minimum of 
the long run marginal cost curve.  This process, in principal at least, is designed to 
provide incentives for efficient investment. 
 
The regulatory process may be described as follows.  Firstly, the regulated firm puts 
forward a proposal which outlines the proposed prices and terms of access.  This proposal 
is required to form prices through a defined process.  Firstly, regulated firms must build 
revenue projections from ‘building blocks’ such as the asset base, capital and operation 
expenditure and the weighted average cost of capital.  Each ‘building block’ must be 
justified with supporting information.  The proposal then becomes a public document, and 
other stakeholders are invited to comment.  Comments also usually become public 
documents.  The regulator then releases a draft decision, outlining its opinions in relation 
to each of the points in the proposal and inviting the infrastructure owner to revise its 
proposal accordingly.  This is followed by a further round of consultation, a revised 
proposal and a final decision by the regulator.  The infrastructure owner can either accept 
the final decision, or exercise its right to a court determination.  A full description of the 
process can be found in ACCC (1995). 
Is the Process Objective? 
The process described above, with its focus on dry economic ‘building blocks’ such as 
WACC and asset values, appears at face value to be an objective application of economic 
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theory and data with a clear social welfare function to be optimised.  There may be a great 
deal of discussion between the regulator, the infrastructure owner and the customers who 
use the infrastructure, but this is in the character of information gathering by the regulator 
to inform its decisions, rather than any form of consensus-building process as would 
occur in a parliamentary setting.   
 
However, is the decision really objective, the optimisation of a resource allocation 
function set out in the legislation, or does it just appear to be?  The answer turns on the 
issue of forecasts.  The regulator, as discussed, builds a model of the ‘best practice’ 
infrastructure, which is then forecast forward through the regulatory period in order to 
provide appropriate revenue or price caps.  Forecasts are based upon two things; data and 
assumptions.  The former are objective and the latter are not, a distinction which will be 
made clearer in the discussion below.  It is an important distinction to make, because data 
alone rarely provide unequivocal results.  Rather, some assumptions are usually needed to 
establish preferred results. 
 
By way of a very simple example, consider the series of numbers 1,3,5,7…. and the set 
{9,10,11,12}.  Which, of the set {9,10,11,12} is the next in the series?  Many would 
suggest that nine is the next number, as the series contains odd numbers, and nine is the 
next odd number.  However, it is possible to construct a valid argument for any of the set 
{9,10,11,12} as the appropriate next number in the series.  This is because a polynomial 
of order n can be fitted to any series of n numbers.  For example, in the above cases, the 
following formulae hold (where y refers to the result and t to the observation number; for 
example t=5 is the 5th in the series): 
 
y = {1,3,5,7,9} tyi 21+−=  
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Indeed, even if the series were y = {1,3,5,7, 4532187}, one could express this by the 












992547443 ttttyi +−++−=  
  
Each of the models above is equally correct, which means that each forecast (9,10,11,12 
or 4532187) is also correct.  The situation an economic regulator faces is much more 
complex than a series of numbers, but the principle remains the same; economic theory 
can assist in constructing a model, but if the model produces several results using 
objective data alone, economic theory cannot assist in determining which is correct.  In 
this case, subjective assumptions will need to be made concerning some of the inputs in 
order to form a judgement about which is the best answer.  A subjective assumption is 
underpinned by the preferences of those who make it; a preference for simplicity in the 
above number series causes most people to judge that the model predicting nine is the 
best model.   
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If an economic regulator, or indeed any bureaucratic agent, cannot use objective 
information alone, then he or she faces great difficulty in maximising social welfare in the 
fashion dictated by the resource allocation function drafter by parliament.  Subjectivity in 
the process means that the bureaucratic agent finds themselves part of a social choice 
mechanism, which is quite different from the intent of the resource allocation mechanism 
encapsulated in legislation.  In effect, the social choice has shifted from parliament to the 
bureaucratic agent, without necessarily changing its character.  The consequences of this 
are discussed below, in a model which forms the centre of this paper.  First, however, it is 
useful to examine some general results for social choice mechanisms.  
Social Choice Mechanisms 
This section describes two results pertaining to social choice mechanisms.  The first of 
these, Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, is a general result, pertaining to the class of all 
social choice mechanisms.  The second, the model at the centre of this paper, is an 
application of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem to the case of authority delegated by a 
parliament to a bureaucratic agent via a legislative resource allocation function. 
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem  
Arrow’s (1950) ‘Impossibility Theorem’ is perhaps the most pervasive theory in the 
social choice literature, and the original paper has generated thousands of responses in the 
literature.  Starting from the position that a social choice mechanism should be judged by 
its consequences for individuals, Arrow endeavoured to discover whether there is some 
way in which one can aggregate rational individual preferences into a rational social 
preference function.  His now famous ‘Impossibility Theorem’ shows that there is not.  
The theorem is based upon a number of conditions, which Arrow shoed cannot be 
simultaneously satisfied.  These, as summarised in Arrow (1998) are as follows: 
• Universality: the social choice mechanism is defined and transitive over all logically 
possible profiles of preference orderings over the set of alternatives. 
• Monotonicity: If BA p  in some social preference ordering, and A is raised in an 
individual preference profile, BA p holds in the new social preference profile. 
• Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: If all individuals have the same 
preference ordering for some set of alternatives, then the social preference ordering of 
these alternatives will be the same, regardless of preferences over other (irrelevant) 
alternatives. 
• Non Imposition: A social preference mechanism is not imposed.  That is, there is not 
some pair of alternatives for which the social choice is the same, regardless of 
individual preference orderings. 
• Non-Dictatorship: The social preference schedule is not imposed by an individual’s 
preferences, regardless of the preferences of other individuals. 
 
One can replace monotonicity and the independence of irrelevant alternatives with the 
Pareto principle; that is every individual has the relation BA p , then BA p holds in the 
social preference relation as well.  The results are almost identical; imposition of the 
Pareto principle merely removes the possibility of negative dictatorship, where the social 
choice is never the outcome the dictator wants.  The result of the theorem is that a social 
choice mechanism results in either a social choice which is completely unreflective of the 




Arrow’s theorem has generated thousands of papers in response.  Most of these seek to 
prove it is untrue, or to describe conditions in which impossibility can be overcome.  
Broadly speaking, the literature may be divided into two parts.  Firstly, there are the 
papers which examine the very fundamental notions underpinning Arrow’s theory.  
Secondly, there are the papers which endeavour to relax or change one or other of the 
conditions, to examine the results of doing so.  It would be impossible in this paper to do 
justice to the literature.  However, below I summarise some of the results in each field, 
where they pertain to the central task of this paper. 
 
Buchanan (1954) attacks the link between individual preferences and social preferences, 
suggesting that the link from individual to social rationality is in error, and that social 
rationality cannot be compared with the rationality of individuals in the group; one is in 
effect talking about two different things and just because individual preferences do not 
provide a ‘measuring stick’ does not mean that one does not exist.  The problem with an 
approach whereby social welfare is divorced from individual preferences is that it 
becomes, as Feldman (1980) suggests, a rather barren and empty concept.  Moreover, as 
Plott (1976) notes, it is not just whether individual and social welfare are connected that is 
the issue; any social choice mechanism that requires some form of internal consistency is 
likely to face problems of impossibility.1
 
Sen (1995) suggests that a better approach might be to look not at consequences and 
outcomes, but rather at procedures and institutions; what kind of outcomes do our 
institutions give us, and are they appropriate.  This, as he notes, is completely different to 
the standard economic analysis where procedures and institutions are a side issue; a 
means by which we get to the heart of the analysis, social welfare.  Some of the 
conclusions of this paper can be interpreted in the context of looking to procedures and 
institutions, rather than welfare maximisation, in order to address issues associated with 
delegation of authority to bureaucratic agents. 
 
Plott (1976) provides a comprehensive account of attempts to overcome Arrovian 
impossibility by altering or weakening the conditions which underpin it.  One might, for 
example, define a social choice mechanism over only some preference relations, or leave 
some preference relations undefined.  Leaving aside the question of how one might 
decide which preference relations to ignore, the end result of doing this is that 
dictatorship is defined over ‘free triples’; groups of three outcomes which are not 
restricted by having a preference relation ignored.  This provides a little extra freedom, 
but the fact that the free triples might overlap limits the freedom substantially.  Moreover, 
as the number of players in the game, and their heterogeneity of preferences increases it 
becomes progressively more difficult to find cases where impossibility does not influence 
results. 
 
One could also relax transitivity,2 and either make it weakly transitive, or replace it with 
the condition that there is no cyclicality.  However, the former results in Arrow’s dictator 
being replaced by an oligarchy, and the latter results in numerous ‘collegiates’ forming, 
                                                 
1 Buchanan (1954) is not particularly concerned with consistency, arguing that the ability of majority vote 
legislatures to experiment with outcomes and then reverse decisions later is precisely their strength.  This 
strength, however, is a product of a lack of information about outcomes, and it does not seem unreasonable 
to require some consistency over outcomes which are known. 
2 Plott (1976) does not define monotonicity as a separate item, as Arrow does.  Rather, it is implied by the 
way in which transitivity is defined. 
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any two of which can impose their will on the remainder of society.  This is an 
improvement, but not a very substantial one.   
 
One could also relax the independence of irrelevant alternatives condition, and allow 
preferences to change as the set of possible outcomes changes.  As Plott (1976) notes, this 
is akin to replacing preferences with standards; things one will accept rather than things 
one likes.  It also shifts the focus from outcomes to behavioural patterns and constraints.  
However, as soon as one endeavours to impose some form of constraint on the 
consistency of choices in the sets, impossibility begins to become an issue.   
 
 Before moving to the model which lies at the centre of this paper, it should be noted that 
it is possible to relax one final assumption of Arrow.  Arrow was looking for the most 
general results he could, and so he made no explicit assumptions about utility.  
Specifically, he did not assume that it was cardinal and comparable.  The utility theory of 
19th Century economics had been underpinned by cardinal and transferable utility, but this 
had fallen from favour as a means of describing utility by the mid-20th Century, because, 
as Sen (1995) notes, there is no scientific basis for interpersonal comparisons of utility.  
However, if one assumes cardinal, transferable and comparable utility, then the problem 
of impossible preferences vanishes, as one can compare the preferences of each party and 
maximise their sum.  Note that utility must be both cardinal and comparable in order for 
this to occur. 
A Model of Bureaucratic Decisions as Social Choice  
This section formalises the notion that the actions of bureaucratic agents are a form of 
social choice, and shows how Arrow’s theorem applies in this context.  Note first that the 
activities of bureaucratic agents involve the collation of information and views from 
various stakeholders.  In the example above of economic regulation, the process has a 
formal structure, but it is not atypical of the general process.  Note also that, unlike the 
pure Arrovian framework, utility is not entirely ordinal and non-comparable.  For 
example, profits and environmental emissions are both aspects of utility which can be 
counted and compared (though not necessarily with each other). 
 
To formalise the model, assume the bureaucratic agent is an economic regulator, and that 
the other two players are the regulated firm and a representative customer.  Assume there 
are n possible outcomes of the regulatory process, each of which is discreet and mutually 
exclusive.  Each player forms a preference schedule, consisting of an ordering of the n 
outcomes.  Assume that these individual preference schedules follow Arrow’s (1950) 
axioms, namely universality and monotonicity in preferences and independence to 
alternatives irrelevant to a given preference choice. 
 
The process of economic regulation is a formally structured representation of the general 
case where bureaucratic agents and their constituents interact in order to achieve a given 
outcome by which they hope to maximise social welfare.  During the process, each party 
reveals information to the others in a public fashion regarding the outcomes it prefers.  
Reflecting the nature of utility in the game (described above), there are two types of 
information, between which each party can distinguish: 
• Objective information: which can be objectively assessed, quantified and compared 
between all players in the regulatory game. 
• Subjective information: which is either private to a player or, if public, can neither be 
meaningfully compared between players, nor objectively assessed by them. 
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Profit streams are an example of the former, whilst differing views on the social impacts 
of an infrastructure expansion are likely to be an example of the latter.  Note that there is 
no requirement for any party to reveal all of its objective or subjective information.  All 
that is required is that each party is able to develop an understanding of the preference 
schedule of the other two. 
 
The mapping of the utility associated with each outcome into the information set is one-
to-one.  In other words, the two concepts are synonymous; information is merely a way of 
describing utility.  The difference between the two types of information is the mapping; 
the objective information mapping is one-to-one and common knowledge, whilst the 
subjective information mapping is one-to-one and private.  One consequence of this is 
that the revealed objective information is always truthful, whilst revealed subjective 
information need not be; it could include lies and ambit claims. 
 
Through the information revelation process, each party comes to understand the 
preference schedules of the remaining two.  Moreover, each party understands how those 
preference schedules are described; whether by objective information, subjective 
information or a mixture of both.  This leads to the following result: 
• If the preference schedule of each party can be described only by objective 
information, or if there is only one binary ordering (per party) where subjective 
information is decisive and this is not the binary ordering between the first and second 
favoured outcome, then the resource allocation function is not impossible. 
• If subjective information is decisive for more than one binary ordering or it 
determines the order of the first and second outcome for any party, then the resource 
allocation function is impossible in the Arrovian sense. 
 
In the latter case, it is impossible for the bureaucratic agent (or indeed, anyone else) to 
optimise social welfare in an objective fashion, based upon the (revealed) preferences of 
the players, because it becomes impossible to compare utility between players in the 
game.  Some explanation is required.  Decisive subjective information is defined as 
follows: if one had only objective information about one party’s choice, and this lead to 
, but the party concerned reports based on a combination of 
objective and subjective information, then this subjective information is decisive in the 
binary choice between B and C.   
CBA ff BCA ff
 
The presence of a small amount of subjective information need not render a resource 
allocation function impossible unless it is decisive for the choice between the first and 
second outcome because, even though the subjective information cannot be precisely 
quantified, it can be roughly estimated.  For example, if, as previously, objective 
information about one party’s choice leads to , but the party concerned reports 
based on a combination of objective and subjective information, then one 
knows that the value of the subjective information is greater than the difference in the 
value of objective information for B and C, but less than the difference in the value of 
objective information between A and C.  However, if the party reports based on 
subjective information being decisive, there is no longer an upper limit, and it becomes 







The key question is the relative frequency of each outcome above.  Since it requires only 
very little subjective information for welfare comparisons to be rendered impossible and 
hence for social welfare maximisation to be similarly rendered impossible, it seems that 
the actual applicability of a resource allocation function by parliament to a set of 
decisions made by bureaucratic agents may be rather limited.  Since the use of such 
functions is widespread, it is worthwhile to explore their likely consequences, which is 
the topic of the following section. 
Consequences of Impossibility 
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem suggests two possible outcomes: either one player 
becomes the dictator or the social choice function is unreflective of individual 
preferences.  If the operation of a legislative resource allocation function by ostensibly 
objective bureaucratic agents is impossible, then the actual result of delegation by a 
parliament will be one of these two outcomes.  The questions are then ‘which one?’ and 
‘what are the consequences?’.  It is difficult to provide a general answer to the first 
question, but it is possible to explore the consequences of each potential outcome. 
 
If the outcome is Arrovian dictatorship, Arrow’s theorem provides no guidance as to who 
might become the dictator.  However, Selten (1975) in discussing the outcome of games 
where many outcomes are possible suggests that a small perturbation, or ‘trembling hand’ 
is often sufficient to direct the game towards a certain outcome.  Here, the trembling hand 
appears likely to be the power mismatch between the bureaucratic agent and other players 
in the game; even if the mismatch is small, it seems likely to ensure the bureaucratic 
agent will become the Arrovian dictator. 
 
Bureaucratic agents are generally chosen on the basis of their professional ability; 
economic regulatory agencies are staffed with economists, social workers staff social 
service agencies and so on.  The result, then, might be termed a ‘dictatorship by 
professionals’.  Some might suggest that this is an ideal outcome; a modern realisation of 
the Platonic ideal of philosopher kings.  However, whilst professional skills are based 
upon the development of objective knowledge, the dictatorial status of these professionals 
is based upon their use of subjective judgement.  This is somewhat ironic. 
 
It is not necessarily the case that a bureaucratic agent in the position of an Arrovian 
dictator would make poor choices.  In fact, the relevant professional might make choices 
which later transpire to have been very beneficial to society.  The problems associated 
with this approach stem from the consequences of the process, not from the outcomes of 
decisions.  The first of these consequences pertains to engagement with the bureaucratic 
agent.  Many resource allocation functions either rely partially upon external support, or 
are designed to further goals external to the decision itself.  For example, economic 
regulation of monopoly infrastructure is designed not only to ensure monopoly 
infrastructure assets do not earn monopoly rents, but that competition can develop in 
potentially competitive upstream and downstream markets.  Likewise, the provision of 
social services to disadvantaged communities is designed not only to ensure they have 
access to adequate food, clothing and shelter, but also to provide incentives to improve 
their situation.  However, if a bureaucratic agent is an Arrovian dictator then by 
definition, any party engaging with the bureaucratic agent who disagrees with him or her 
knows that they will not prevail.  The incentives to engage are thereby dulled; firms are 
less likely to enter the industries policymakers hope they might and disadvantaged people 
are more likely to drift away from the processes designed to help them. 
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A second consequence occurs over time.  When a bureaucratic agent first begins his or 
her task, they are likely to have only limited information about the industry or sector with 
which they deal.  Over time, that information set becomes better.  In a formal sense, by 
learning on the job, subjective information is supplanted by objective information.  
Industry or sectoral participants may also assist this process by releasing more of their 
private information, where doing so assists their cause.  Ultimately, if enough objective 
information is collected, subjective information may no longer be decisive.  However, if it 
does not (or until it does) a catch 22 exists; if the bureaucratic agent does not have access 
to objective information, decisions made on the basis of subjective information may be 
incorrect.  However, the more objective information the bureaucratic agent has, the more 
decisions he or she is able to make concerning the industry.  The industry/sector may face 
the choice between regulatory creep and poor-quality decisions.  
 
The design of the resource allocation function or the personality of the bureaucratic agent 
may be able to resist regulatory creep, but the historical record is not particularly bright.  
Hoogenboom & Hoogenboom (1976) chart the history of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC) in the US which, over the hundred years of its history prior to the 
Staggers Act reforms of 1980, saw gradual increases in regulatory oversight until it 
effectively ran the rail industry in the postwar period, giving railways almost no freedom 
to react to changing circumstances.  The solution in the US case was to radically wind 
back regulation, and to make it very difficult for the ICC (and its successor after 1996, the 
Surface Transportation Board) to impose regulation.  In the closing years of the 19th 
Century and early years of the 20th Century in the UK, the Railway Commissioners Court 
and its successors (see McWilliams, 1923) faced a similar expansion in role, but the 
eventual solution was the other logical conclusion, the nationalisation of the British rail 
system in 1948.   
 
If the second of Arrow’s outcomes obtains, then the social preference will be unrelated to 
any individual preference, or indeed any combination of individual preferences.  It is not 
clear a priori how the social preference schedule will be formed, but it seems most likely 
that it will be formed through a process of negotiation between the three parties in the 
regulatory process, each of whom will have to move from their preferred situation in 
order to achieve an outcome.  This seems relatively mild, and is indeed what one might 
expect in a bargaining situation.  However, it results in two important consequences.   
 
The first of these is that unreflective social preferences mean that the parties to the 
regulatory process cannot ascertain its outcome even with full knowledge of the 
information sets of the other parties, let alone when some are acting strategically.  The 
outcome will only be seen once negotiations are all complete.  For some players, this may 
represent an unacceptable risk, leading to a similar lack of engagement as described 
above for regulatory dictatorship.  Moreover, one cannot simply suggest that this be 
alleviated by designing a better negotiation framework; Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem 
makes it clear that it is impossible to predict the social outcome from individual 
preferences, not that it is difficult to do so. 
 
If one has unreflective social preferences and a system of negotiation for determining 
outcomes, it seems likely that, over time, participants in the negotiation process might 
attempt to alter it to suit their needs.  One means of doing this might be to release private 
information strategically into the negotiation process.  Stigler (1971) describes this 
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strategic process of seeking to influence the bureaucratic agent as ‘regulatory capture’.  
However, this process of regulatory capture is something of a double-edged sword.  As 
objective information is brought into the public domain, it may be used to make more 
decisions pertaining to the operations of the industry (or other stakeholders) concerned 
than was possible when this information was private.  Such collective decision-making 
may not be in the best interests of those originally holding the private information.  For 
example, a firm subject to economic regulation may find that more of its investment 
decisions are made in the public sphere than was formerly the case.  Alternatively, 
welfare recipients may find that the conditions of their payments change as government 
learns more about their spending patterns, and that spending on ‘inappropriate’ goods 
(such as drugs or alcohol) might be curtailed. 
Options for Successful Governance of Social Choice Issues 
This paper began by tracing how social choice is aggregated and delegated as a society 
becomes more complex.  It shows that the end point of this process is one where social 
choice is not so much delegated as abrogated.  In order to find a solution to this problem, 
one must therefore go back to the starting point of the process of aggregation and 
delegation and ascertain whether a different path might be followed.   
 
In his original paper, Arrow (1950) suggested four ways in which resource allocation 
decisions in a society might be made: 
• By the market. 
• By a dictator. 
• By voting. 
• By convention. 
 
Choice made by a dictator seems an undesirable option, leaving three possibilities.  The 
resource allocation function approach discussed in this paper is one form of governance 
by convention.  As has been shown, it seems unlikely to work particularly well.  This, 
however, does not necessarily mean that other means of governance by convention will 
suffer the same fate. 
 
First, consider governance through market mechanisms.  If resource allocation decisions 
sit outside the market due to some form of market failure, the solution could be to change 
the design of the market, such that it can accommodate the resource allocation decisions 
with no market failure.  The creation of tradeable emissions rights to address pollution 
externalities is an example of this.  However, in many instances, this may be very 
difficult.  For example, economic regulation exists precisely because the monopoly being 
regulated is ‘natural’, and competition is so hard to introduce.  Also, addressing issues 
such as externalities or information asymmetries involves designing better property rights 
regimes.  The designers face the same problems as the regulators and public managers 
described in this paper; if parliament charges them to design a set of market rules, they 
seem unlikely to be able to act solely in an objective fashion in the same way that 
regulators and public managers cannot.  Thus, there may be some, but limited scope for 
designing a market.  There is, however, still a great deal of utility to be gained from using 
the market as a benchmark.  Sonnenschein (1974) provides an axiomatic treatment of a 
competitive market as a choice mechanism.  Thus, if a choice process is designed and 
described in terms of its axioms, one can compare it with the competitive market 
benchmark and examine whether the two are axiomatically equivalent.  If they are, then 
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the resource allocation choices of the process will replicate the choices a competitive 
market would make, thus maximising social welfare. 
 
The second possibility could be to put issues to the vote; either by plebiscite or via a 
parliament.  This removes the delegation step which has been the subject of this paper.  In 
principle, this is an appropriate option; the issues associated with the resource allocation 
function are removed.  However, in practice, the approach is unlikely to work because it 
would rapidly fill the parliament with decisions, and may render it inoperable in a 
complex society with many public choice decisions to be made.  This, in fact, was 
precisely the reason why the delegation process alluded to in this paper arose in the first 
instance. 
 
The final option is to choose a different convention.  Sen (1995) makes this argument, 
suggesting that focussing on outcomes, as the resource allocation function of 
parliamentary legislation attempts to do is not a useful approach, due to the operation of 
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem.  Instead, he suggests, society should focus on the 
building of institutions which engender good, or at least not too objectionable, social 
choices.  There is no particular reason why these institutions need necessarily be 
associated with government.  Indeed, a key component of the problems identified in this 
paper be the centralisation of decisions in a single body like government.   
 
Institutional building is a complex process, and it may not be clear what the ‘right’ 
institution should be in a given situation.  However, two things provide at least some hope 
that a society might be able to experiment successfully to develop better institutions 
which avoid the problems of delegation outlined in this paper.  The first of these is based 
upon public services that can be provided at a local level (roads, schools, parkland etc).  
Whilst there may be economies of scale in the provision of such services, Tiebout (1956) 
shows how the ability of members of society to ‘vote with their feet’ in choosing where to 
live based upon the level of localised public service provision (which they pay for 
through local taxes) can provide a mechanism by which neighbourhoods can compete in 
resource allocation mechanisms to determine which institutional structures work.  Indeed, 
this is precisely the intent of a federalist system, albeit at a smaller scale.  Whilst issues 
may exist in determining the optimal size and nature of neighbourhoods, the principles of 
such benchmark competition are well established. 
 
Secondly, humanity has a long history of developing solutions to resource allocation 
mechanisms outside the framework of economics, using sets of locally develop social 
norms.  Such social norms work better at smaller, rather than larger scales, due to the 
difficulty of holding together larger communities of interest.  They are most useful in 
dealing with over-exploitation of common resources, such as fisheries.  Ostrom (1990) 
catalogues some of these locally-develop social norm systems, many of which have 
served (or did serve) their societies for much longer than parliamentary democracy has 
served ours.  In many cases, such social norms might be difficult to engineer.  As an 
approach, they may also be inimical to the centralised determinism of bureaucracy; as 
indeed is that other important social construct for allocation resources, the market.  
However, they have a proven history of successful operation which motivates further 
examination by policymakers. 
 
It should be noted that different institutional arrangements do not necessarily avoid 
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem.  Instead, they bring the issue of social choice to the 
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centre of the decision-making process, rather than labouring under the misperception that 
it has been somehow removed through delegation to bureaucratic agents.  This allows for 
a focus on procedures which address social choice, rather than on outcomes which are in 
any case involve the unachievable maximisation of social welfare. 
Conclusions  
This paper has argued that one of the key underpinnings of the process by which 
decisions on public goods are delegated from a parliament to a bureaucratic agent is 
incorrect.  That is, a parliament cannot create a resource allocation function which an 
objective bureaucrat can use to optimise some aspect of social welfare, because there is 
very rarely sufficient objective information for the relevant bureaucratic agent to do so.  
Instead, assumptions based upon subjective information must be made, and in so doing, 
the choice made by the bureaucratic agent becomes a social choice, subject to Arrow’s 
Impossibility Theorem.  This gives rise to some troubling consequences in respect to the 
way governance is performed. 
 
Unfortunately, there does not seem to be a solution whereby subjective information can 
be banished from the decision-making framework.  Instead, the paper suggests that the 
optimal approach may well be to bring social-choice to the centre of the resource 
allocation problem which arises.   It may be difficult, in a general sense, to move beyond 
this statement, because each problem may require a different social-choice solution.  
Certainly, the structure within which decision-making occurs successfully for one 
problem need not be the same as the structure which is successful for a different problem.  
This means it may not be particularly attractive to governments, enamoured of general, 
deterministic solutions that be applied ‘across the board’.  However, the long history of 
addressing social choice problems through such localised solutions suggests that people 
are actually rather good at doing so, even if governments are not. 
 15
Bibliography 
Arrow, K.J. (1950) A difficulty in the concept of social welfare, Journal of Political 
Economy, 58,4,328-46. 
Arrow, K.J. (1998) Arrow’s theorem. in J. Eatwell, M. Milgate & P. Newman (eds) The 
New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Vol1. London: MacMillan Press, 124-6. 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) (1995) Access regimes: A 
guide to Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act. Canberra: AGPS. 
Bromley, D.W. (ed) (1992) Making the Commons Work. San Francisco: ICS Press.  
Buchanan, J.M. (1954) Social choice, democracy, and free markets, Journal of Political 
Economy 62, 2, 114-23. 
Feldman, A. (1980) Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory. Boston: Martinus 
Nijhoff. 
Hardin, G. (1968) The tragedy of the commons, Science. 162, 3859, 1243-8. 
Hoogenboom, A. & Hoogenboom, O. (1976) A history of the ICC: From panacea to 
palliative. New York: WW Norton & Co. 
McWilliams, R.F. (1923), The future of railway control, Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
38, 1, 31-53. 
Ostrom, E. (1990) Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective 
action, Cambridge UK: Cambridge Uni Press.  
Plott, C.R. (1976) Axiomatic social choice theory: An overview and interpretation, 
American Journal of Political Science. 20, 3, 511-96. 
Quinet, E. (2006) France: avoiding competition. in J.A.Gomez-Ibanez & G. De Rus (eds) 
Competition in the Railway Industry: An international comparative analysis. 
Cheltenham UK: Edward Elgar, 81-110. 
Selten, R. (1975) A re-examination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in 
extensive games, International Journal of Game Theory. 4, 25-55. 
Sen, A. (1995) Rationality and social choice, American Economic Review. 85, 1, 1-24. 
Sonnenschein, H. (1974) An axiomatic characterization of the price mechanism, 
Econometrica. 42, 3, 425-34. 
Stigler, G.J. (1971) The theory of economic regulation, Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science. 2, 1, 3-21.
Tiebout, C. (1956) The pure theory of local expenditures, Journal of Political Economy. 
64, 416-24.  
Virtue, G.O. (1909) The Minnesota railway valuation, Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
23, 3, 542-47. 
 
 16
